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Abstract: 
Following an extended anti-mining campaign, El Salvador became the first country to adopt 
a legal ban on all forms of metallic mining. This article uses process tracing to map direct, 
indirect and mediated linkages between the anti-mining mobilization and the formal adoption 
of a mining prohibition by the national legislature in 2017. It draws on 78 interviews with 
campaign activists, legislators, government officials, business leaders and legal teams, and 
combines this information with legislative documents and reports, public opinion data, legal 
documents from an investment dispute filed against the Salvadoran government, and blogs 
and website of the Mesa Nacional Frente a la Minería Metálica. This analysis gives particular 
attention to the spatial reach and breadth of the anti-mining networks; fissures within and 
situational realignment of the political elite; and the strategic use of diverse institutional open-
ings (docking points), some of which were adapted to new purposes by movement entrepre-
neurs. Although major obstacles to sustainable development and environmental protection 
remain in El Salvador, this article identifies a set of iterative interactions between activist 
alliances and institutional actors that can successfully contribute to policy change. Keywords: 
Mining, social movements, networks, public policy, legislation, investment disputes, commu-
nity organizing, political institutions, El Salvador, Central America. 
Resumen: De las calles a la Cámara: Movimientos sociales y la prohibición de la minería en 
El Salvador 
Tras una extenso periodo minero, El Salvador se convirtió en el primer país en adoptar una 
prohibición legal de toda manera de minería metálica. El presente artículo emplea el rastreo 
de procesos para ilustrar los vínculos directos, indirectos y mediáticos entre la movilización 
anti-minera y la adopción formal de una prohibición minera por parte de la legislatura nacional 
en 2017. Se basa en 78 entrevistas a activistas de campaña, legisladores, funcionarios guber-
namentales, líderes empresariales, y equipos legales, y combina esta información con docu-
mentos e informes legislativos, datos de opinión pública, documentos legales de una disputa 
de inversión presentada contra el gobierno salvadoreño, blogs y la página web de la Mesa 
Nacional Frente a la Minería Metálica. Este análisis presta especial atención al alcance 
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espacial y a la amplitud de las redes anti-mineras; fisuras internas y realineación situacional 
de la élite política, y el uso estratégico de diversas aperturas institucionales (puntos de atra-
que), algunas de las cuales fueron adaptadas a nuevos propósitos por los empresarios del mo-
vimiento. Aunque los principales obstáculos para el desarrollo sostenible y la protección am-
biental continúan en El Salvador, este artículo identifica un conjunto de interacciones iterati-
vas entre las alianzas activistas y los actores institucionales que pueden contribuir con éxito 
al cambio de políticas. Palabras clave: minería, movimientos sociales, redes, política pública, 
legislación, disputas de inversión, organización de comunidades, instituciones políticas, El 
Salvador, América Central. 
Introduction 
In 2017, El Salvador became the first country to adopt a national ban on all forms 
of metal mining. This remarkable policy development came after twelve years 
of antimining mobilization. This study highlights the distinctive features of that 
campaign and analyses the ways in which social mobilization connected with 
formal institutions and official policymaking. As such, it brings together two 
fields of study that have often been separated along disciplinary lines – the study 
of informal, non-institutional, “street-level” politics of social movements, and 
the study of formal, institutional politics and policymaking by government offi-
cials. 
 A large body of research has emerged to analyse social movement origins, 
alliance structures and tactics. The connections between movements and their 
policy consequences (or lack thereof), however, are less well documented (Bosi, 
Giugni & Uba, 2016; Silva, 2017). Social movement research generally finds 
that mobilizations have identifiable political goals, and that they are often at least 
partially successful in achieving their objectives (Amenta, Caren, Chiarello & 
Su, 2010; Biggs & Andrews, 2015; McAdam & Boudet, 2012). How and why 
they have an impact on policy remains a matter of dispute. Given the significant 
role of social movements as an expression of collective demands, and the fre-
quency with which people employ protests in search of substantive change, the 
circumstances under which popular mobilization becomes politically conse-
quential should be better understood. Movement theorists and public policy spe-
cialists are now attempting to model the sequences and interactive effects that 
animate the movement-policy nexus, and more accurately map possible causal 
mechanisms. 
 Documenting the connections between movements and policy is, however, 
an inherently difficult task. The challenges are in part due to movement volatility 
and the wide array of processes and timelines involved (Bosi, Giugni & Uba, 
2016; McAdam & Boudet, 2012). As Silva (2017, 6) notes, “the very character-
istics that draw us to social movements – their passion, fluidity, malleability, 
precariousness, creativity, and contingent nature – make it hard to establish their 
connection to observed changes with high degrees of confidence.” Solid research 
on the movement-policy link requires careful process tracing, a labour-intensive 
methodology that tends to limit the scope of the analysis to a small number of 
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cases, which can blunt the contribution to theory building and rigorous testing. 
This research also requires a commitment to studying movement dynamics and 
policy processes over time, so that interactions can be monitored across various 
phases and any long-term consequences can be identified. Analysis across time 
is particularly critical in megaproject studies, where economic incentives in fa-
vour of project development are persistent and achievements in one campaign 
may give way to defeat in another. 
 Social movement analysts and public policy specialists have begun to de-
velop nuanced conceptual tools and frameworks, introducing concepts like di-
rect, indirect, mediated and joint effects, as they track the ways that movements 
interact with other political processes (Giugni, 2004; Amenta, Caren, Chiarello 
& Su, 2010). In his ambitious study of ecology, antinuclear and peace move-
ments in the United States, Switzerland and Italy between 1975 and 1999, Marco 
Giugni (2004) found that protest alone had “at best a marginal to moderate ef-
fect” on policy, at least as defined in terms of adoption of legislation and in-
creases/decreases in spending (p. 70). Instead of “direct effects,” in which policy 
outcomes are determined exclusively by the demands of activists and protesters, 
change was more likely to depend on a “mediated” process that operated through 
a “joint effects” model. In Giugni’s formulation, joint effects referred to the com-
bined impact of movement mobilization (typically in the form of increased pro-
test), alliances with strategic political elites in the institutional arena, and shifts 
in public opinion demonstrating increased support for movement goals. 
 Other analysts have also called attention to this interactive effect. Reviewing 
the literature on the political consequences of movements, Amenta, Caren, Chi-
arello & Su (2010) found movement success aligned with organizational size, 
multisectoralism, and diverse and complex leadership structures; with the con-
struction of “resonant prognostic and diagnostic frames” which identified prob-
lems clearly and presented viable solutions; and with the use of political and 
electoral strategies to gain penetration and leverage, including activist insertion 
into formal institutional roles (pp. 296-97). To trace the connection between 
movement activities and policy results, these analysts employed a “political me-
diation model,” which highlighted the importance of “engaging in collective ac-
tion that changes the calculations of institutional political actors, such as elected 
officials and state bureaucrats, and adopting organizational forms and strategic 
action that fit political circumstances” (p. 298). 
 Although research on the interconnections between movements and policy is 
growing, much of it has produced only tentative results. A small number of clas-
sic cases in U.S. and Europe have drawn disproportionate attention, making it 
difficult to know how well the findings apply to less celebrated cases or to dy-
namics in other regions, including Latin America. Research Group Mega (RGM) 
has taken on the challenge of exploring the movement-policy nexus in Latin 
America “to contextualize social movement pressure on polices and institutions 
in a broader political economy framework, taking into account how actors with 
various interests and power resources form contending coalitions around policies 
50  |  ERLACS No. 106 (2018): July-December 
 
and institutions relating to mega-development projects” (Silva, Akchurin & 
Bebbington, 2018). Megaprojects in this region typically advance with state sup-
port under regulations designed with limited local consultation and with inade-
quate attention to environmental, social and human rights consequences (De 
Castro, Hogenboom & Baud, 2016; Bebbington & Bury, 2013). Social move-
ments sparked by megaprojects in Latin America struggle to break through these 
constraints and gain access to the policymaking process. 
 The present study provides a longitudinal analysis of megaproject mobiliza-
tion and policy change by tracing the arc of transition in El Salvador’s metal 
mining policy. It plots the path from policies that opened up mining investment 
to legislation that formally closed the sector down. In line with other research in 
this field, my analysis gives close attention to processes of political mediation 
that connect movement activists with state actors and formal institutions. I use 
the concept of punctuated equilibrium to describe rhythm of policy pulsation, in 
which the “long periods of stability that students of public policy have noted to 
be characteristic of most public policies most of the time” combine with an “oc-
casional burst of policy innovation” (Baumgartner 2006, 25-26). 
 This work draws on responses provided in 78 semi-structured interviews con-
ducted in El Salvador in 2010, 2012 and 2017. Interviewees included anti-min-
ing activists and movement organizers; legislators, party leaders and administra-
tive officials; business leaders and legal representatives; and research analysts 
involved with the Salvadoran mining conflict.1 This study also incorporates doc-
uments from websites and blogs of the Mesa Nacional Frente a la Minería Me-
tálica and its affiliates; recorded testimony and legal briefs from the investment 
dispute between Pac Rim Cayman LLC and the Republic of El Salvador at the 
World Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID); public opinion data from the Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública 
(IUDOP) at the Universidad Centroamericana (UCA) in El Salvador and from 
CID-Gallup; and reports on legislative processes posted on the website for El 
Salvador’s Asamblea Legislativa.2 This study points to five observations: 
1. Analysis of the movement-policy nexus requires a long timeline, extending 
beyond a particular campaign or legislative session to capture pauses, ad-
vances, reversals and strategic adaptations that emerge over time. Such slow 
movement studies allow scholars to trace the ways in which movements both 
succeed and fail in their attempt to affect political processes, and to better 
understand the circumstances under which movements have consequences 
in terms of policy change and institutional adaptation. 
2. The ability of social movements to influence public policy may depend on 
their spatial reach (ability to connect across local and national scales), and 
breadth (ability to link across sectors). Movement networks can disseminate 
information through interconnected clusters built on common identities and 
shared experiences (bonding). They can also extend connective tissue by 
linking sectors across social and political divides (bridging). Bridging 
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processes may be particularly important if durable policy change requires 
the construction of alliances that transcend partisan polarization. 
3. Movements are more likely have a direct effect on the policy process in the 
agenda-setting phase of policy development. Movement actors can articu-
late grievances, raise awareness, and frame possible solutions, thereby open-
ing the policy arena to new ideas and debates. 
4. Movement influence on advanced phases of the policy process, including 
policy formulation, adoption and implementation, may be indirect, serving 
to spark official deliberations that then proceed without further movement 
involvement, or mediated, involving iterative interactions between activist 
alliances and institutional actors who preside over formal decision-making. 
5. Crossing the boundary between mobilization and policy networking requires 
the identification of docking points, or spaces where activists can insert pub-
lic demands into the formal mechanisms of policy revision. In formally dem-
ocratic systems, institutional engagement may be facilitated by mobilization 
of supportive public opinion. 
The paper begins with an overview of mining policy in post-war El Salvador and 
describes the early advance of the industry. It then turns to the emergence of an 
opposition movement, and examines the bridging and bonding linkages that 
shaped movement expansion. The unfolding dynamics of the policy debate are 
traced by examining mining bills introduced in the Salvadoran legislature. The 
processes that culminated in the official mining ban are described. Finally, the 
criteria suggested by Amenta (2006) to assess the policy consequences of social 
movements are reviewed, drawing on the mediated effects model to summarize 
the findings. 
Political transitions and market openings 
After a decade of civil war, El Salvador’s post-war political settlement left the 
newly created Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) party in power.3 The 
1992 peace agreement gave the demobilized Frente Farabundo Martí para la Li-
beración Nacional (FMLN) legal status and the opportunity to compete for 
power, but ARENA consistently won the presidency and, with allied parties, 
controlled the main institutions of government for two decades. Its policies fa-
voured the interests of a transnationalized sector of the economic elite, which 
had acquired a strong position in banking and finance during the post-war tran-
sition (Segovia, 2002). Policymaking relied heavily on the planning proposals 
of FUSADES, a USAID-funded think tank that helped to staff the technical min-
istries (Spalding, 2014). 
 Achieving four consecutive presidential terms, ARENA leaders had the op-
portunity to oversee the neoliberal transformation of El Salvador’s economic 
model. Reforms included privatization of the banking and telecommunications 
systems, trade liberalization, expansion of the export processing zones, 
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deregulation and, in 2001, a controversial policy of dollarization. To promote 
foreign investment, ARENA presidents signed investment laws, bilateral invest-
ment agreements, and free trade agreements that allowed foreign investors to 
bring cases to international tribunals in the event of an investment dispute. 
 As elsewhere in the region, El Salvador revised its mining law during this 
period of neoliberal reform. New legislation, adopted in December 1995 under 
President Armando Calderón Sol (1994-1999), incentivized investment in this 
largely undeveloped sector by providing additional legal protections and tax ex-
emptions. Exploration by junior mining companies progressed in the early 2000s 
under Francisco Flores (1999-2004), when the government adopted a yet more 
investor-friendly amendment to the mining law, reducing the royalties from 4 
per cent to 2 per cent and increasing the size limit on concessions (Henríquez 
2008, 28; TAU 2011, 33). The new rules attracted investor attention; twenty-
nine companies held exploration licenses in 2006 (TAU 2011, 39). 
 The most advanced project in 2004 was El Dorado mine, where the Canadian 
mining company, Pacific Rim, had acquired an existing concession through mer-
ger in 2002. The clock was ticking for the expiration of the concession when 
Pacific Rim acquired it, and the new management moved quickly to seek an 
extraction permit in December 2004. Pac Rim proposed a subterranean mine in 
Cabañas, one of the country’s poorest departments. This project envisioned a 10-
year production process, with two years to start up, six years of operation, and 
two years to close down. The projected value of gold exports from Cabañas 
mines topped US$1 billion, with a formal sector workforce of 2,818 in six pro-
posed mines (TAU 2011, 41-42, 45), making this envisioned mining complex 
one of the largest (albeit short lived) enterprises in the country. According to an 
economic projection commissioned by Pacific Rim with former Finance Minis-
ter Manuel Hinds (2007), the El Dorado mine would produce an 8.4 per cent 
increase in the GDP of Cabañas, leading to a 23 per cent drop in the department’s 
extreme poverty levels. 
Constructing a national opposition movement 
Launched formally in 2005, El Salvador’s anti-mining movement forged cross-
spatial linkages between local and national-level associations and built cross-
sectoral connections of both “bonding” and “bridging” varieties (Putnam, 2000). 
This array of ties helped the movement to expand its reach and diversify its strat-
egies, and provided the flexibility needed to adapt to shifting opportunities. 
Community-level allies brought local knowledge and urgency to the process, as 
residents mobilized to prevent imminent mining encroachment. National-level 
allies, although further removed from the mining zones, provided physical prox-
imity to decision-making centres and greater familiarity with policymaking pro-
cesses, which allowed resistance activists to make strategic choices about alli-
ances, timing, and funding. Bonding networks drew on relationships among sim-
ilar actors, and were infused with mutual understanding and trust. Bridging, by 
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contrast, connected groups across wider cultural and power divides, which per-
mitted valuable resource transfers that were sometimes accompanied by tension 
and mistrust. 
 These networking strategies parallel the distinction between “close” and 
“weak” ties that has generated substantial academic discussion in the study of 
social capital (Granovetter, 1982; Marsden & Campbell, 2012; Biggs & An-
drews, 2015). Networks built on close ties, in which participants have frequent, 
routine, and often organic (based on family, friendship and neighbourhood) con-
nections, are imbued with familiarity and permit a ready flow of interaction and 
communication. These mechanisms produce closed-circuit patterns of infor-
mation diffusion that tend to reinforce message content through repetition and 
trust-based validation. Weak ties, in contrast, link actors beyond their primary 
groups and provide more distinctive and less predictable flows of information. 
As the literature on the strength of weak ties indicates, these connections allow 
networks to extend beyond the clusters of redundant communication that char-
acterize close-tie alliances, and kindle new linkages that can both broaden and 
accelerate the diffusion of mobilizing information. The cultivation of weak ties 
can also facilitate multisectoralism and permit greater functional specialization 
in keeping with the variation in resources that broadened networks can mobilize. 
These differences in capacity encourage repertoire diversification by connecting 
those, for example, who have different kinds of expertise with regard to lobby-
ing, media access, legal strategies, and political party ties. 
 In terms of social movement impacts on public policy, close ties built on 
bonding techniques can stoke attitudinal uniformity and inspire recurring mobi-
lization, including passion-driven protest and electoral engagement, by provid-
ing emotional support and validation. Weak ties built on bridging principles, in 
contrast, can extend the network beyond its historical boundaries and encourage 
broader awareness of issues, promoting fuller shifts in public opinion. Although 
the latter increase the risk of internal tensions and network fragmentation, they 
may also provide the leverage needed to affect a broader swath of popular views. 
This strategy, however, requires brokers who can link previously disconnected 
movement segments and build bridges that span the gaps. 
Local mobilization and bonding ties 
“Vulnerability theory” contends that people who are most at risk due to a prox-
imate threat are most likely to find it troubling (Eisenstadt & West, 2017). In a 
recent study of the intersection between vulnerability, extraction, and public 
opinion, Eisenstadt and West drew on this theory to predict which sectors in 
Ecuadorian society would express the greatest level of concern about environ-
mental conditions. Their survey results and geocoding of respondent location 
confirmed that concern was greatest among those facing objective vulnerability 
to harm (experiencing water scarcity and working in ecotourism, for example), 
and those residing within 30 kilometres of an active mine. This link between 
54  |  ERLACS No. 106 (2018): July-December 
 
physical proximity to mining, the perception of threat, and environmental con-
cern suggests that residents of communities where mining projects are planned 
may develop heightened concern about detrimental consequences. 
 Grievances alone, however, are not normally sufficient to trigger protest. Po-
litical process theory highlights the impact of opportunities, emphasizing the sig-
nificance of a supportive political environment, which permits open organizing 
and attenuates risk (Tarrow, 2011). Prior experience with mobilization has been 
associated with protest recurrence through the creation of “strategic capital,” 
which Almeida (2014, 25) defines as “repositories of collective knowledge about 
which strategic and organizational elements in their localities are best employed 
to generate joint action.” Eckstein (2001, 33-37) has identified “popular cultures 
of resistance” as a factor contributing to bouts of defiance and protest in Latin 
America. Previous mobilizing can generate both enduring organizational forms 
and “abeyance structures” (Taylor, 1989) that fade during periods of inactivity 
but spring quickly to life when new opportunities arise. 
 In the Salvadoran case, the history of community mobilization in the pro-
spective mining region during the civil war and post-war transition left an or-
ganizational trace on which new rounds of resistance could build. The Salva-
doran “gold belt” included areas that had experienced active combat during the 
1980s civil war. Several communities in concessioned territory had endured ex-
pulsion and flight following massacres and military campaigns only a little more 
than a decade before. Community residents underwent lengthy relocation in ref-
ugee camps, particularly in nearby Honduras, where Mesa Grande served as a 
temporary resettlement camp (Smith-Nonini, 2010). The experience of desperate 
flight followed by life in the camps left the trace of collective trauma, as victims 
attempted to cope with the magnitude of their losses. It also left an organizational 
foundation, as this population constructed various forms of self-governance 
while displaced. Although formally separated from the military conflict, some 
refugees had family or community ties to the FMLN and maintained contact with 
combatants, who had an unofficial presence in the camps (Viterna, 2015, 94). 
 Following years of displacement in the 1980s, many Salvadoran refugees re-
turned to the villages in the northern region of El Salvador from which they had 
fled (ES2417; Smith-Nonini, 2010). They formed local and regional organizati-
ons like the Coordinadora de Comunidades de Refugiados y Repobladores 
(CCR, later Asociación de Comunidades para el Desarrollo de Chalatenango) 
and the Asociación de Desarrollo Económico (ADES) in the repopulated com-
munity Santa Marta. These organizations in turn combined forces under the na-
tional umbrella of the Asociación de Comunidades Rurales para el Desarrollo de 
El Salvador (CRIPDES), which claimed to represent 100,000 people in 398 com-
munities.4 Many in the repopulated communities maintained strong ties to the 
FMLN, which, following its post-war transition into a political party, tended to 
win local elections there by a large margin. 
 This was the setting into which the mining companies advanced. Although 
some people in the gold belt were won over by the prospect of mining jobs or 
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the general economic growth promised by company representatives, others 
viewed mining investors as intruders who threatened their communities with re-
newed displacement and political annihilation. Chalatenango activists tell of res-
idents in the municipios of Las Flores, Guarjila, Arcatao and Nueva Trinidad 
who repeatedly disrupted the activities of the company advance teams, closely 
monitoring their comings and goings, and surreptitiously removing survey mark-
ers planted in their fields. As exploration advanced, activists took more forceful 
steps, blocking company vehicles that attempted to enter their zone, tracking 
down drilling sites, and threatening to burn equipment if it was not hauled away.5 
In communities where the mining opposition was weaker, the movement focused 
on identifying allies and organizing informational sessions. Local leaders 
learned, according to one organizer, to “hablar sin hablar,” that is, communicate 
without making explicit statements that would invite rejection and retaliation. 
Their protest style emphasized artistic and cultural activities, including a “Cam-
inata Verde en Defensa del Agua,” for example, instead of a marcha or protesta, 
terms which local people traditionally identified with leftist organizations 
(ES0417). 
Spatial alliances and local-national connections 
As community opposition deepened, wartime collaboration and post-war mobi-
lization left organizational tracks on which to transit across the local-national 
divide. Wartime collaboration established links between local and national level 
activists and left trust bonds forged through shared experience. Post-war mobi-
lization in opposition to ARENA-backed market reforms, including health care 
and water privatization (Almeida, 2014, 70-78), also connected local and na-
tional leaders. CRIPDES affiliates from the former war zone repeatedly jour-
neyed to the capital to join in national-level protests. Prior experiences with or-
ganizing permitted the rapid identification of potential allies whose usefulness 
and credibility as partners could be reliably assessed. 
 As the prospect of mine development became imminent, community leaders 
in the emerging antimining front reached out to “trustworthy” organizations at 
the national and international levels for assistance in interpreting and framing 
the evolving mining debate.6 In 2005, ten organizations came together to form 
the Mesa Nacional Frente a la Minería Metálica.7 This coalition, which com-
bined grassroots community organizations from the mining zone with national-
level NGO allies, became the backbone of El Salvador’s anti-mining mobiliza-
tion. In addition to CRIPDES, national network partners included the Unidad 
Ecológica Salvadoreña (UNES), a national environmental organization; Funda-
ción de Estudios para la Aplicación del Derecho (FESPAD), a human rights or-
ganization; and the Centro de Investigación sobre Inversión y Comercio 
(CEICOM), an activist-oriented research centre, among others. (See figure 1). 
Between the community organizations operating at the local level in territory 
targeted for mining concessions and their carefully curated national allies with  
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Figure 1: Overview of Salvadoran Antimining Movement Alliance and Mechanisms 
 
Organizations listed for illustrative purposes. See endnote 7 for details. 
specializations in environmental rights and legal protections, El Salvador’s anti-
mining front achieved notable spatial and multisectoral reach. 
 Mesa activists also collaborated with an expanding network of transnational 
allies, who provided additional resources and support (Democracy Centre, 
2017). These allies included similarly situated organizations in neighbouring 
Central American countries, where mining development was already underway. 
Other allies hailed from U.S. solidarity organizations, such as the U.S.-El Salva-
dor Sister Cities network, whose work in El Salvador dated back to the civil war. 
Their long-term presence and community-level work permitted movement “do-
mestication” and promoted horizontal networking structures (Spalding, 2013). 
Assistance also came from international non-governmental organizations (IN-
GOs) that operated in global power centres and provided thematic specialization 
and technical expertise. These allies included networks like MiningWatch Can-
ada, which documented the growing number of mining conflicts around the 
world, and legal rights organizations like the Centre for International Environ-
mental Law, that provided strategic support for communities engaged in inter-
national investment disputes.8 This international network took formal shape as 
the “International Allies” in 2010, and provided funding that allowed the Mesa 
to hire a full time staff. Organizational meetings of Mesa members were sched-
uled every two weeks (ES2017), and affiliates cross-posted messages on social 
media sites, where these organizations had a robust presence. 
 Mesa leaders report working hard to frame a consistent story about who they 
were and what they wanted. They adopted a razor sharp focus on a mining ban 
as their principal policy objective, a position they adhered to with notable tenac-
ity. They orchestrated a long and growing list of actions that included week-long 
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events carried out simultaneously in several cities; hundreds of people marching 
from the communities to demonstrations in front of central government build-
ings in San Salvador; delegations to visit mining communities in neighbouring 
countries; petition and letter-writing drives; mock internment of mining compa-
nies; and local festivals in celebration of life and water. Their action frame crys-
tallized around water rights, offering a resonant message that connected com-
munities across the country. This message focused on the Río Lempa, which was 
“the most important freshwater source in El Salvador, providing 50 per cent of 
the drinking water, 50 per cent of hydroelectric energy, and irrigation for agri-
culture in more than half of the country” (McKinley, 2018). Concern about the 
Río Lempa, repeatedly described as the “aortic artery of the country,” seeded 
both local and national alarm. The impact of mining on water access and quality 
in multiple regions of the country connected people across the local and national 
scales, expanding network spatial reach. 
Bonding and bridging linkages to Catholic Church allies 
Diverse church actors became recurring and critical partners, with Catholic lead-
ers and activists operating within the Mesa and beyond it. These linkages con-
tributed to both spatial reach, drawing on connections between the national 
Church hierarchy and local parishes, and breadth, as new sectors were incorpo-
rated into the network. These connections built on both the bonding ties of fa-
miliar long-term collaborators and bridging ties between autonomous actors with 
infrequent and tenuous links. 
 Close ties with the Mesa emerged initially through the Catholic Church’s so-
cial action wing, Cáritas El Salvador, which was a founding member of the 
Mesa. Cáritas provided a physical office space for the Mesa’s coordination ac-
tivities during the first two years of its operation (ES0817). Justicia, Paz e Inte-
gridad de la Creación (JPIC), a Franciscan-sponsored organization, joined the 
Mesa soon after its founding, and its representatives became featured contribu-
tors and emissaries at national and international events (ES0112). These activist 
church agents had previously-established trust bonds with Mesa activists based 
on prior collaboration, and they played a critical role as brokers, linking the an-
timining network with more establishment-oriented church leaders in a classical 
bridging alliance (See figure 1). 
 The movement achieved greater breadth when Catholic ecclesiastical leaders 
aligned with the campaign, following their own institutional discourse and pro-
cesses. Although less consistently engaged with the mining issue and more po-
litically and socially removed from the Mesa core, the upper hierarchy of the 
Salvadoran Catholic Church entered the fray publicly in 2007 as the Latin Amer-
ican Catholic Church leaders more generally turned to embrace an environmen-
tal message. At the urging of the Archbishop of San Salvador, Fernando Sáenz 
Lacalle,9 the Conferencia Episcopal de El Salvador (CEDES), composed of the 
country’s eleven bishops, issued a joint statement calling on the government to 
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deny permits for metal mining (CEDES, 2007). Declaring “this class of mining 
causes irreversible damage to the environment and surrounding communities,” the 
bishops concluded that metal mining in El Salvador “should not be permitted.” 
 As mining policy reform continued to stall, CEDES repeated this call three 
years later under the incoming Archbishop of San Salvador, José Luis Escobar 
Alas (CEDES, 2010). Public pronouncements by these widely respected elite 
actors helped to energize and expand the movement beyond well-worked circuits 
on the left.10 Although some individual parish priests still preached in support of 
mine development (Cartagena, 2009, 244; ES1517), national church leaders 
maintained an oppositional stance, facing down weekly pro-mining protests out-
side the Cathedral where the Archbishop offered the Sunday mass (ES1710; 
ES3510). 
Conflict and the electoral arena 
As the anti-mining network expanded, activists identified docking points 
through which they could connect with policymakers and press them to include 
this issue on the policy agenda. Through iterative engagement with institutional 
actors, they helped to open space for fuller discussion in which new questions 
could emerge. These mediated effects ultimately contributed to the punctuated 
equilibrium dynamic, in which a durable policy suddenly experiences sharp and 
sweeping rejection and is replaced by an alternative approach that garners broad 
support. 
 As protests sponsored by the Mesa and/or the FMLN raised the profile of this 
conflict, and additional organizations aligned with and expanded this network, 
the electoral risks associated with continued mine promotion began to increase. 
After almost a decade of collaboration with would-be gold mining investors, the 
ARENA government slowly backed away from mine promotion. In the lead up 
to the 2006 legislative election, Pac Rim officials who once reported an array of 
accommodations now found permits delayed and paper work returned for clari-
fication. Gaps concerning the failure to acquire surface property rights were 
found in their extraction application, and corporate assurances about cyanide re-
mediation and water safety no longer bought official acquiescence. In the space 
that opened with application deceleration, officials acquired additional infor-
mation about mining risks. After Minister of Environment and Natural Re-
sources (MARN), Hugo Barrera (2006), expressed personal concerns about min-
ing, permitting processes ground to a halt. 
 The development of a well-organized anti-mining movement, combined with 
a growing electoral threat to ARENA dominance, encouraged a re-calculation of 
the political costs of mining advocacy. The business subsector that had initially 
supported mine development failed to lock down broad elite backing. With no 
strong business lobby anchoring the pro-mining side, the fourth ARENA presi-
dent, “Tony” Saca shifted toward the opposition. Facing the country’s first truly 
competitive post-war presidential election, with popular journalist Mauricio 
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Funes now running as the FMLN’s standard-bearer, Saca moved official oppo-
sition out into the open in March 2008, proclaiming that “in principle, I do not 
agree with granting these permits” (as quoted in Pac Rim Cayman, 2009, 30). 
The following year, only weeks before the March 2009 election, he called in to 
a live Catholic radio station programme on mining, and pledged that he would 
“not grant a single permit” (López Piche, 2009, 2). In defiance of Pacific Rim’s 
threat to file an investment dispute claim, Saca continued, “They are about to 
file an international claim and I want to make this clear: I would prefer to pay 
the $90 million than to give them a permit” (p. 2). 
 FMLN candidate Funes, along with his vice presidential candidate, FMLN 
leader and former guerrilla Salvador Sánchez Cerén, campaigned on a platform 
critical of metal mining, while their ARENA rival, Rodrigo Ávila, remained si-
lent. Launching their campaign in November 2007, the Funes team spent 17 
months bringing their “Caravan of Hope” to municipalities across the country 
(Almeida, 2014, 82-86). During a stop in Cabañas, Funes declared, “As long as 
[the mining companies] fail to demonstrate that these projects do not contami-
nate the environment and [do not damage] the health of our population, we are 
not going to permit metal mining” (Redacción Diario Co Latino, 2008). Building 
outward from the FMLN’s formal membership of 80,000, his campaign net-
worked with an array of social movement activists to get out the vote. Resistance 
organizations that had mobilized against privatization of healthcare and water in 
previous years were remobilized to support Funes’s election (Almeida, 2009). 
Although the race tightened in the final lap, Funes emerged victorious in a 51.3 
per cent vs. 48.7 per cent split. 
 A few weeks after Funes was elected, Pac Rim filed its claim against El Sal-
vador at ICSID. The company’s initial $90 million claim rose to $314 million 
(Pac Rim Cayman, 2013) before settling at $250 million as the case progressed. 
As the Funes administration officials moved into government offices and FMLN 
leaders renewed their commitment to a mining ban, the assassination of anti-
mining leaders in Cabañas began. By the end of the year, three activists in Caba-
ñas had been murdered. Intimidation practices reminiscent of the civil war era 
reappeared, taking an additional toll in the months that followed. 
From the streets to the chamber 
Unlike much of Latin America, where mechanisms of direct democracy became 
part of the institutional landscape during the period of electoral democratization 
(Breuer, 2007), direct forms of citizen participation remained limited in El Sal-
vador. The country lacked a grassroots recall process, for example, and citizen 
groups could not introduce bills directly (Artiga González, 2007, 335-37; 
ES0117). Civil society groups with an interest in changing the law had to recruit 
cabinet officials or legislators to serve as sponsors of their bills.  
 Interest in mining remained high, however, and over the twelve years in 
which the metal mining conflict persisted, three kinds of proposals were 
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presented to the legislature. The first two proposals involved top down initiatives 
devised by corporate lobbyists and administrative technocrats, respectively. The 
third bill, in contrast, reflected the iterative interactions between social move-
ment and institutional actors that are commonly found in the mediated model of 
policymaking. 
 The first bill, introduced by Partido de Conciliación Nacional (PCN) legisla-
tors in November 2007, contained reforms that would clear the way for approval 
of extraction licenses. As noted in the ICSID testimony of Pac Rim managers, 
this bill was elaborated in close consultation with company lawyers (Pac Rim 
Cayman, 2016, vi-36). Corporate lobbyists and consultants were hired to mobi-
lize support for a change in existing law that would remove provisions requiring 
applicants for extraction licenses to acquire surface property rights for land 
above subterranean tunnels.11 Lawmakers from the PCN, an old-line conserva-
tive party and frequent ARENA partner in the legislature, agreed to introduce a 
bill to this effect so that Pac Rim could resolve the deficiencies in its extraction 
application (Pac Rim Cayman, 2016, vi-36). This bill languished in 2008 as the 
Saca administration backed away from mine development. 
 The second bill emerged from technical discussions involving top state ad-
ministrative officials and external experts. Based on a growing recognition of 
the kind of state capacity that is required for successful mine regulation, Salva-
doran officials opened an internal discussion about a possible permitting freeze. 
In 2010, the Funes administration commissioned a full-scale external report to 
assess mining viability in El Salvador. Carried out by the Spanish consulting 
company, TAU Consultora Ambiental, and reviewed by a blue ribbon oversight 
committee to ensure its quality,12 the report identified a long list of environmen-
tal vulnerabilities and described in detail the deficiencies in the government’s 
regulatory capacity (TAU, 2011). According to this assessment, major policy 
change and institutional development would be needed in 17 areas, with 63 spe-
cific actions identified for change (TAU, 2011, Table 19, 81-84). Armed with 
this document, the Ministers of the Environment and the Economy jointly pre-
sented a proposal to the legislature in August 2012, calling for a formal morato-
rium. Noting that an outright ban could trigger ICSID demands by any of the 26 
companies that currently had exploration rights, Environment Minister Hernán 
Rosa Chávez (2012) concluded, “In reality, [the moratorium] is the only option.” 
 Mesa representatives rejected this initiative, arguing that its moratorium re-
versal provisions could allow a future administration to declare the conditions 
ripe for mining, in spite of any community and environmental damage that 
would be unleashed (ES1012). Instead, the Mesa-backed bill called for an out-
right ban on metal mining. First introduced in December 2006, this bill was pre-
sented repeatedly on behalf of the Mesa by a dedicated group of FMLN legisla-
tors. According to the Asamblea Legislativa’s online database, this bill or a 
lightly adapted equivalent was reintroduced between one and four times a year 
over the next eight years, for a total of 15 submissions between 2006 and 2014. 
This collaboration between Mesa activists and FMLN bill sponsors illustrates 
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how movements may have a direct effect on the policymaking process in the 
agenda-setting phase. 
 A growing body of literature analyses movement-based political parties in 
Latin America, particularly in Bolivia (MAS) and Ecuador (Alianza País) (An-
ria, 2013; Van Cott, 2005). This kind of linkage emerges when a political party 
assumes the discourse, frames and mobilization strategies deployed by social 
movements; when movement actors support a political party’s electoral work, 
encouraging an identification with a party, sharing its messages, and getting out 
the vote in favour of the party’s candidates; and when, if victorious, party leaders 
name social movement actors to positions in government. These connections are 
often regarded as inherently unstable because of the tension between the institu-
tionalization required for political party development and the non-institutional 
and transitory characteristics of social movements. The Salvadoran case repre-
sents a relatively durable version of this blend, perhaps because of the high de-
gree of ideological polarization that persisted there in the post-war years. 
 The close link between the FMLN and Salvadoran social movements, de-
scribed by Paul Almeida (2006) as “social movement partyism,” has drawn re-
peated attention in the academic literature. Analysts of the large-scale mobiliza-
tion against health care privatization in 2000-2003, where up to 200,000 partic-
ipants turned out in waves and dressed in white to express solidarity with hospi-
tal workers, note the strong support provided by FMLN leaders (Almeida, 2014, 
70-78; Smith-Nonini, 2010). Guillermo Mata, the president of the national asso-
ciation of physicians and the high-profile leader of this protest, went on to be-
come the FMLN’s Vice Presidential candidate in 2004 and, following that de-
feat, a three-term FMLN deputy. Mesa activists secured statements of opposition 
to mining from the FMLN’s presidential candidates, and celebrated the appoint-
ment of Mesa allies to administrative positions when they won. 
Adoption of a formal legislative ban 
The antimining movement had succeeded in getting the mining debate onto the 
policy agenda in El Salvador by 2006, but this coalition had been unable to se-
cure significant policy change. Counter pressure, in the form of corporate pene-
tration of the domestic political process and use of international mechanisms 
through the ICSID process, stymied the Mesa’s efforts to get mining banned, as 
did the overall post-war political settlement, which had long favoured market 
openness and economic deregulation. In 2017, however, after a twelve-year 
campaign, the situation suddenly changed. Within weeks, a new mining law, 
which prohibited all forms of metallic mining, won unanimous support in the 
national legislature. This dramatic policy shift leaves us with three questions: 
1. How did this measure finally win legislative approval? 
2. How can we explain the absence of opposition votes? 
3. What was the role of the antimining movement in securing this outcome? 
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The present study points to three processes that ultimately contributed to the 
adoption of El Salvador’s mining ban. First, the Mesa network continued to mo-
bilize in opposition to mining, with demonstrable consequences in terms of pub-
lic opinion. Second, external pressure was successfully deleveraged when the 
ICSID case was resolved, while leaving behind a sense of national vulnerability 
that added urgency to the deliberations. Third, the antimining movement recali-
brated its leadership structure, building on bridging mechanisms to extend its 
reach beyond partisan alliances and stitch together a broadened coalition. This 
three-part explanation combines continuous elements (i.e., ongoing Mesa organ-
izing), which fuelled a slow but persistent erosion of public support for mining, 
with catalysts (i.e., the resolution of the ICSID case and shifts in the anti-mining 
leadership structure), where sudden changes in the alignment of players opened 
new territory for policy debate. 
 Securing both domestic and international assistance, the Mesa maintained a 
durable coordination capacity and a growing base of public support. The move-
ment had particular success in communities targeted for mine development. A 
public opinion survey in municipios where exploration concessions had been 
granted revealed that opposition to mining was already the dominant view in 
2007. When asked, “Do you consider El Salvador an appropriate country for 
mining operations?” 62.5 per cent of respondents in mining communities said 
“no” (IUDOP, 2008, 1). A repeat survey eight years later found that opposition 
had become yet more comprehensive, with the per cent saying “no” increasing 
to 79.5 per cent (IUDOP, 2015, 58). Almost four out of every five respondents 
in this zone of heightened vulnerability concluded that mining was not an appro-
priate activity for El Salvador in 2015. 
 Further evidence of local opposition appeared when opponents adopted a var-
iant of the consulta process employed by anti-mining movements elsewhere in 
Latin America (Walter & Urkidi, 2016). Using the citizen consultation provi-
sions included in El Salvador’s 2005 Municipal Code (Código Municipal, 2010, 
21), CRIPDES organized five municipal-level consultations on the mining ques-
tion in the country’s gold belt between 2014 and 2017 (ES1617; ES1517).13 The 
towns selected for these consultations were strongholds of the FMLN and polit-
ically atypical, even for their departments.14 The NO vote was predictably over-
whelming in these towns, ranging from 98 per cent to 100 per cent. Strategically 
placing the consultas in propitious territory; dispersing the operational costs 
across the seasons and years; inviting domestic and international observers to 
witness the process; and promoting media coverage of the results, Mesa affiliates 
sustained the message of community opposition to mining and kept the debate 
in the public eye. 
 Pacific Rim’s ICSID demand raised the stakes on this issue, even as it im-
peded legislative action. After almost eight years of legal pressure, the company 
lost its ICSID case in October 2016.15 Once the threat of repeated pounding by 
disgruntled junior mining companies retreated, the legislative deliberations en-
tered a few phase. The ICSID experience had raised alarm in the legislative 
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chambers, and it contributed now to the forward movement. As one legislative 
observer (ES0117) noted, “With the claim filed in ICSID, we could see that we 
were unprotected, that any other firm could file a demand against us and we 
would be vulnerable. We needed to act to prohibit [metal mining] to prevent that 
from happening again. That [ICSID] decision could have gone the other way.” 
Salvadorans had faced the threat of paying out $250 million to a company that 
had never fully established its right to mine, or of being required, through exter-
nal pressure, to authorize the initiation of an industry with well-documented en-
vironmental risks, which the country was, on the basis of the best evidence, un-
prepared to manage. The possibility of a ripple effect, as other similarly situated 
mining companies followed suit, perhaps with greater success, brought the po-
tential costs of inaction into sharp relief. 
 Ironically, an institution and process that had been designed to promote in-
ternational investment by increasing protections available for investors may 
have served, at this stage, to accelerate investment restriction. As anti-mining 
mobilization continued and evidence that the country was unprepared to control 
the industry accumulated, political leaders increasingly recognized the need to 
take definitive action that would contain the threat of new legal demands. When 
the policy freeze imposed by active litigation was lifted, a ban suddenly became 
a feasible alternative. In the words of an ARENA legislator (ES0317), “This year 
we found there was a window of opportunity.” 
 During this juncture, a new round of high profile intervention by Catholic 
Church leaders drove the process forward. In this final lap, collaboration be-
tween the Mesa and the Church hierarchy shifted to accent the role of the 
Church. This recalibration of the antimining alliance triggered some tensions 
and indications of mistrust, which are not uncommon in bridging relationships. 
Although this dissonance came at a cost, the emphasis on Church leadership also 
succeeded in easing the partisan identity of the cause and in giving the process 
a fresh start. As one Asamblea respondent (ES0117) observed, 
One thing that helped the Committee and the Assembly to move forward in 
2017 was that the Church presented a new proposal. The Committee wasn’t 
required to go back to the old proposals that had already been debated and 
had already generated polarized responses. Instead, it could start fresh with a 
new proposal that was clear and straightforward. With the earlier ones, some-
times the bills were internally contradictory, or they missed an important is-
sue. With this new one from the Church, those problems did not arise. 
This step involved collaboration among a variety of Church-aligned institutions 
and policy strategists, several of which were identified as bridging allies in figure 
1. The Jesuit-run Universidad Centroamericana (UCA) took the lead on devel-
oping a new mining prohibition bill (ES1017; ES1717; McKinley, 2017). With 
assistance from the university’s legal team and faculty members in the depart-
ment of legal studies, the UCA’s mission-driven “Social Projection” office over-
saw a technical analysis of the bills under legislative review and, finding 
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deficiencies, moved to draft a new version in 2016. The new bill prohibited me-
tallic mining both above and below ground, and it set a two-year deadline for the 
elimination of artisanal gold mining operations. 
 UCA administrators presented the new proposal to Archbishop Escobar Alas, 
who embraced it as his own. Under his leadership, a delegation of Catholic au-
thorities formally presented the draft bill to the Asamblea on February 6, 2017 
with pre-arranged sponsorship from key legislative leaders.16 Three weeks later, 
the Archbishop organized a major signature drive in support of the ban, with 
priests circulating petitions before and after Sunday mass. More than 37,000 sig-
natures were collected in a little over a week, and Church leaders gathered sev-
eral thousand followers to accompany them as they carted boxes of petitions to 
the Asamblea. They were met at the entrance by a contingent of Assembly mem-
bers, including Guillermo Gallegos, Assembly president and GANA representa-
tive, who promised rapid action. Claiming that mining was a “life or death 
threat”, the Archbishop called on the legislators to step away from partisanship 
and deliver unanimous support (Gómez & Orellana, 2017). 
 Push back against heightened Church activism followed from well-posi-
tioned mainstream media and conservative leaders. An unnamed ARENA finan-
cier reportedly pressured Auxiliary bishop Gregorio Rosa Chávez (soon-to-be 
named as El Salvador’s first Cardinal) to abandon his opposition (Jimenez, 
2017). The Executive Director of El Diario de Hoy, the country’s major con-
servative daily newspaper, tweeted “The return of the Church to politics fills us 
with sadness” (Redacción UH, 2017). But ANEP, El Salvador’s business peak 
association, took no formal organizational position on the issue (ES1917). Even 
ARENA voices that had once favoured mining were now subdued (ES2617). 
“After the Pacific Rim case,” one observer noted, “no one wanted to defend min-
ing” (ES1017).17 
 The bill was approved quickly in a 69-0 vote on March 29, 2017 (Asamblea 
Legislativa, 2017). After a decade of legislative delay, debate, and dismissal, 
legislators from all five parties lined up to endorse this new policy. Support was 
a given with FMLN lawmakers, who festooned the chamber with banners read-
ing “No a la minería, sí a la vida.” GANA, which had been formed in 2009 
following Saca’s expulsion from ARENA and served as the FMLN’s frequent 
legislative partner, also endorsed the measure. The solitary PDC vote had been 
previously pledged in support of the ban, and provided mining opponents a slim 
margin of victory. The only question, then, concerned the legislators from 
ARENA and the PCN, who controlled the remaining 49 per cent of the seats (see 
appendix 1). 
 Deputies in El Salvador traditionally owed their candidacy to their party, not 
directly to the voting public, and party bloc voting in the Asamblea was the norm 
(FUSADES, 2017). Changing the voting position of a legislator normally re-
quired persuasion at the level of party leaders rather than recruitment of individ-
ual members. New election rules governing preferential voting for individual 
candidates and the option of split ticket balloting, however, hinted at a possible 
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reconfiguration of legislative voting practices down the road. Change was de-
veloping slowly, although disciplined party voting was still the norm. 
 Reflecting on the unanimity of the prohibition vote, one long-time legislative 
observer noted that the 2015 legislative election brought into office a number of 
new representatives, and that ARENA in particular “had diversified” (ES0117). 
One member of this cohort was John Wright Sol, a US educated former fire-
fighter in Fairfax County, Virginia, who hailed from a prominent ARENA-
founding family. As a newly minted legislator, Wright Sol had volunteered for 
the Environment and Climate Change Committee and registered growing con-
cern about the country’s environmental vulnerability. His decision to throw his 
weight behind the 2017 mining ban helped move his party toward the emerging 
legislative consensus. 
 The biggest surprise was the favourable vote by the PCN deputies, who had 
a history of support for the mining industry, as discussed above. The PCN had 
been ARENA’s most durable legislative coalition partner and was crucial to its 
ability to secure legislative majorities (FUSADES, 2010, 126). With ARENA’s 
shift toward mining opposition, the PCN legislators were now abandoned. One 
legislative observer (ES0117) interpreted the PCN vote as an effort to avoid po-
litical isolation, which was destined, in any case, to be futile (“Their thinking 
was ‘we’ll be alone in our opposition and lose anyway’”). Another (ES2517) 
viewed it as an attempt to avoid public condemnation, not just by Salvadorans 
but by the numerous international organizations that were now focused on the 
case. 
 This voting pattern suggests that strong “social cascade effects” (Buamgart-
ner, 2006, 43) contributed to the legislative sweep as political parties that had 
once endorsed pro-mining legislation now moved into the opposition. As mining 
risks grew more visible and prohibition support accumulated, the ban coalition 
achieved a tipping point, and formerly oppositional parliamentary groups tum-
bled into the swelling majority, party by party. For those legislators who were 
not in agreement, the options were to adhere to party decisions to support the 
ban, in spite of personal reservations, or to not vote, either through absence or 
by non-participation. 
 Analysis of national public opinion data collected in the aftermath suggests 
that the ban enjoyed broad national support, and legislators may have been align-
ing themselves with shifting popular preferences. In national polls carried out in 
eight Latin American countries by CID Gallup in January 2018, respondents 
were asked, Do you believe that mining company operations should be permit-
ted, or do you believe that they be prohibited? Fifty-eight percent of Salvadoran 
respondents said that mining company operations should be prohibited, second 
only to the 59 per cent registered in Costa Rica, where an open pit mining ban 
had been adopted in 2010 (CID Gallup, 2018). Fewer than a quarter (24 per cent) 
of Salvadoran respondents stated that mining company operations should be per-
mitted, the lowest per cent in any of the eight countries.18 When those calling for 
prohibition were asked why they opposed the operation of mining companies, 
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68 per cent of those Salvadoran respondents identified environmental damage as 
their main concern. 
Discussion and conclusions 
As with several other contributions to this volume, the present study analyses 
the role of social movements in the policymaking process over an extended pe-
riod of time. This kind of slow movement analysis permits long-form process 
tracing that identifies movement pulsation through surges and eddies. This ex-
tended analysis points to the usefulness of a mediated effects model, which fol-
lows activists and institutional actors as they engage in iterative interactions and 
identifies institutional docking points where proposals advanced toward policy 
change. By tracing the dynamics of contention, we see how movements may fail 
to gain traction when confronting agreements that are firmly embedded in elite 
political settlements or when venue shifts transplant contention from the national 
to the international scale. We also see how movements may ultimately succeed 
in building legislative support even in formerly oppositional quarters, and how 
policy equilibrium may be punctured, followed by the rapid construction of a 
new consensus. 
 Determining the extent of social movement impact on policy change is an 
inherently difficult task, however, given the number of factors that can contrib-
ute to this outcome. To address these conceptual challenges, Amenta (2006) used 
the tools of historical institutionalism to carefully excavate and sequence pri-
mary source material as he examined the impact of the Townsend movement on 
social security policy development in the United States. To determine “when 
movements matter,” Amenta (2006, 31) reviewed the archival record to assess 
the following: whether a challenger altered the plans and agendas of political 
leaders; influenced the content of the proposals as devised by executives, legis-
lators, or administrators; influenced the votes of representatives key to the pas-
sage of proposed legislation; or influenced the speed or nature of the implemen-
tation of legislation. 
 Using Amenta’s guidelines as the standard against which to judge the impact 
of the anti-mining movement in El Salvador, the evidence presented in this study 
supports a positive assessment. The alliance formed by the Mesa Nacional and 
the leadership of the Catholic Church repeatedly pressed for a mining prohibi-
tion, encasing deliberations in an assessment of the environmental and human 
rights costs associated with mining development. This coalition drew on bond-
ing and bridging ties to expand the network’s spatial reach and multisectoral 
breadth, combining the Mesa’s capacity to connect grassroots activists at the lo-
cal and national levels, with the Church leaders’ access to both elite and mass 
publics. Thick movement-party connections that linked Mesa activists and the 
FMLN allowed anti-mining leaders to gain access to party candidates who could 
be persuaded to pledge public support, including at the presidential level. These 
alliances also allowed Mesa leaders to locate FMLN legislators who would 
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sponsor anti-mining bills on their behalf, thus shaping the content of proposals 
that would place this issue on the legislative agenda. 
 Challengers found it difficult to advance when movement targets shifted the 
venue to Washington, D.C., and the ICSID process constricted domestic debate. 
Transferring a hefty piece of the deliberative process to the international scale 
and encasing it in the strictures of administrative law disrupted the processes of 
democratic contention that had permitted social movement actors to bring this 
issue into the national policy agenda. Activists secured a rapid legislative finale, 
however, once the ICSID obstacle was removed. Church leaders played a direct 
role in drafting the bill that was ultimately approved and in lining up agents to 
spearhead the final push. By shifting the framing of the debate away from parti-
san identification and toward national environmental and legal risks, they broad-
ened the consensus on mining and brought along the votes of key representatives 
who had once been on the opposing side. 
 It is possible, of course, that the prohibition would have been approved even 
without the sustained effort of mining opponents. Precise estimation of move-
ment impact requires consideration of such counterfactuals (Amenta, 2006, 30-
31). El Salvador’s small size, heavy dependence on a single river system and 
well-documented vulnerability to climate change could have prompted a policy 
shift away from metallic mining based on technocratic criteria, even in the ab-
sence of a social movement advocating a ban. But it seems unlikely that the 
government would have taken this step without pressure from and accompani-
ment by movement actors. Bold technocratic leadership by elected or bureau-
cratic officials in El Salvador has not been widely observed, nor is it commonly 
seen in mining policy disputes elsewhere in the region. Only Costa Rica has 
adopted similar legislation, and in that case as well, the ban followed years of 
forceful organizing by environmental and community activists. 
 Mobilization by itself, of course, is “often insufficient to effect changes in 
public policy” (Amenta 2006, 24). Giugni (2004, 161) found “no consistent pat-
tern of co-variation” between changes in organizational resources, such as in-
creased movement membership and financial resources, and policy shifts that 
occurred over time. A spike in protests does not translate easily or automatically 
into an outpouring of new policies and programmes. To deal with the divide 
between the “streets” and the “chamber,” social movement activists need to iden-
tify office-holding collaborators and commit to enduring forms of engagement 
with institutional actors, taking on the risks of formalization and centralization. 
 Achievement of a mining ban did not mean a radical redefinition of El Sal-
vador’s development model. Nor did it indicate that this policy change would be 
irreversible. Much of the political settlement devised by Salvadoran political and 
economic elites in the post-war era remained intact, and rollback of environmen-
tal reforms and implementation failures have been common problems in the re-
gion. However, the breadth of mining opposition, as registered in public opinion 
polling and the unanimity of the legislative vote, suggest that a push for renewal 
of metallic mining would face significant opposition. 
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 We are left with the question of generalizability, the Achilles heel of every 
case study. Although El Salvador’s national ban on metallic mining is highly 
distinctive, this study offers insight into the ways antimining coalitions may 
emerge, gain momentum and secure policy approval. The adoption of a ban on 
open pit mining in Costa Rica, the existence of mining prohibitions at the prov-
ince level in Argentina, and local level mine suspensions in Guatemala and Peru, 
among others, suggest that there may be various circumstances under which an-
timining movements have consequences. Fuller specification of those conditions 
awaits future research. 
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Notes 
1. Interviews are referenced with a country code (ES = El Salvador); a randomly assigned 
respondent number; and the year in which the interview was conducted (17 = 2017). For 
more information, see the list of cited interviews at the end of the article. 
2. This study is part of a larger comparative research project on “subterranean politics” in 
Latin America, in which I compare mining politics and policymaking in countries where 
metal mining advanced (Nicaragua and Guatemala) with policymaking processes where 
it has now been banned (Costa Rica and El Salvador). 
3. See discussion of the concept of political settlement in Bebbington, Abdulai, Humphreys 
Bebbington, Hinfelaar and Sanborn, 2018, 3-22. 
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4. http://www.cripdes.net/quienes-somos/historia. 
5. ES2417; Cartagena (2009, 230-231); see also the interview with Francisco Pineda, leader 
of the Comité Ambiental de Cabañas (CAC), by Labrador and Meza (2011). 
6. Early organizers repeatedly described the individuals and organizations they reached out 
to for the initial meetings as “de confianza,” suggesting that trustworthiness was a signif-
icant criterion for inclusion. 
7. Mesa membership rose from the initial 10 organizations to 13 by 2008 (Cartagena, 2009, 
231, 233; Henríquez, 2008, 29). Mesa members in 2006 included ADES, Caritas El Sal-
vador, CCR, CEICOM, CESTA, CAC, CRIPDES, FESPAD, Unión de Comunidades Ru-
rales del Norte de San Salvador y La Libertad (UCRES), and UNES. By 2008, the Aso-
ciación de Estudiantes de Economía Alternativa (ASEAL) of the UCA, the Asociación 
Amigos de San Isidro Cabañas (ASIC), and the Franciscan Justicia, Paz e Integridad de 
la Creación (JPIC) had also joined the coalition. Following shifts and reshuffling, mem-
bership in 2017, when the Mesa was officially composed of 11 organizations, included 
MUFRAS 32, CORDES, Red Activista, and La Maraña, an offshoot of CAC (ES2017). 
8. Actively seeking support abroad, Mesa representatives participated in numerous interna-
tional events and exchanges during the 2005-2017 period (ES0717; ES0312; Democracy 
Center, 2017). ADES leaders, for example, reported attendance at nine international 
events in 2015 alone. The work of the Mesa was recognized with the IPS’s Letelier-Mof-
fett Human Rights award in 2009, and Francisco Pineda of then-Mesa affiliated CAC 
received the prestigious Goldman Environmental Prize in 2011. 
9. Trained as a chemist at the Universidad de Zaragoza in Spain, Archbishop Sáenz Lacalle 
rejected claims by Pacific Rim concerning their proposed processes of cyanide detoxifi-
cation, reportedly finding them unscientific and manipulative (ES3510). 
10. When asked in a 2006 IUDOP public opinion poll, “How much confidence did you have 
… in the following institutions?” 58.2 per cent of respondents said “much” or “some” 
with respect to the Catholic Church, a confidence level which surpassed that expressed 
for all other institutions listed (Artiga González, 2007, 428). 
11. Pac Rim’s lobbyists included former Christian Democratic Party presidential candidate, 
Fidel Chávez, father of Pacific Rim-El Salvador’s Vice-President, Rodrigo Chávez; and 
Francisco Escobar, brother-in-law of then Vice President Ana Vilma de Escobar. See Pac 
Rim Cayman, 2016, vi-52. Rodrigo Chávez’s subsequent murder conviction further tar-
nished the company’s image. 
12. The four-person international oversight committee was composed of Robert Goodland, 
Ann Maest, Allan Astorga, and Anthony Bebbington, who chaired its work (Bebbington, 
Bury, Cuba and Rogan, 2015, 205, fn 24). 
13. Under these provisions, if 40 per cent of registered voters in a municipio petitioned for a 
Consulta Popular, the Consejo Municipal was required to call one. If turnout was at least 
40 per cent of the vote tally from the previous municipal election, then the majority pref-
erence was to be regarded as binding. 
14. The 2014 second round vote for the FMLN presidential candidate in these five communi-
ties ranged from a high of 96 per cent in San José Las Flores to a low of 61 per cent in 
Cinquera, in all cases running substantially above Sánchez Cerén’s national vote per cent 
(50.1%). 
15. In a unanimous vote, the ICSID tribunal concluded that Pacific Rim had never completed 
the extraction license application process due to its failure to secure permission for 
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underground mine construction from the owners of surface property, as required by Sal-
vadoran law (Pac Rim Cayman, 2016). On the basis of this finding, the company’s case 
was dismissed. 
16. The bill was presented by the Archbishop of San Salvador, José Luis Escobar Alas; aux-
iliary bishop Gregorio Rosa Chávez, the president of Caritas; Andreu Oliva, the UCA 
Rector; and José María Tojeira, the director of the Instituto de Derechos Humanos of the 
UCA. Fray Domingo Solís, in representation of the Franciscan JPIC, accompanied the 
second delegation the following month. 
17. See Broad and Cavanagh (2015) on the absence of strong domestic business support for 
mining in El Salvador and Costa Rica; see also Bebbington, Bury, Cuba and Rogan (2015, 
198). 
18. Since the 2018 poll was carried out nine months after the Salvadoran ban was approved, 
reported opposition to mining may have been enhanced by the rallying effect of policy 
victory. 
List of interviews cited 
Code Affiliation Sector Interview date Location 
ES0117 Legislature Government-legislature Oct 17, 2017 San Salvador 
ES0217 Legislator-FMLN Government-legislature, executive Oct 26, 2017 San Salvador 
ES0317 Legislator-ARENA Government-legislature Oct 19, 2017 San Salvador 
ES0417 MUFRAS-32 Civil society-community Oct 25, 2017 Cabañas 
ES0517 Legislator-FMLN Government-legislature Oct 26, 2017 San Salvador 
ES0617 MARN Government-executive Oct 23, 2017 San Salvador 
ES0717 ADES Civil society-community Oct 25, 2017 Cabañas 
ES0817 Cáritas-El Salvador Civil society-religious Oct 19, 2017 San Salvador 
ES0917 Cáritas-El Salvador Civil society-religious Oct 19, 2017 San Salvador 
ES1017 UCA Academic-religious Oct 18, 2017 San Salvador 
ES1517 ARDM Civil society-community Oct 24, 2017 Cabañas 
ES1617 CRIPDES Civil society-community Oct 30, 2017 San Salvador 
ES1717 UCA Academic-religious Oct 30, 2017 San Salvador 
ES1817 MINEC Government-executive Oct 30, 2017 San Salvador 
ES1917 ANEP Business Oct 20, 2017 San Salvador 
ES2017 FESPAD Civil society-human rights Oct 23, 2017 San Salvador 
ES2117 CRS INGO-religious Oct 21, 2017 San Salvador 
ES2417 CRIPDES/CCR Civil society-community Oct 27, 2017 San Salvador 
ES2517 UNES Civil society-environment Oct 27, 2017 San Salvador 
ES2617 Ministry of Finance Government-executive, Business Oct 20, 2017 San Salvador 
ES2717 Legal representative Government-legal representative Sept 7, 2017 Washington, DC 
ES0112 PJIC Civil society-religious Nov 14, 2012 Chicago 
ES0312 ADES Civil society-community Dec 3, 2012 Cabañas 
ES1012 Mesa Nacional Civil society-antimining May 17, 2012 Chicago 
ES1710 Oxfam INGO-development July 13, 2010 San Salvador 
ES3510 CRS INGO-religious July 12, 2010 San Salvador 
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Appendix 1: Number of Salvadoran legislators by session and political party affiliation 
 2003-6 2006-9 2009-12 2012-15 2015-18 
ARENA 27 34 35 33 35 
PCN 16 10 11  6 6 
FMLN 31 32 32 31 31 
GANA (founded in 2009)* - - - 11 11 
Others 10 8   6 3 1 
TOTAL 84 84 84 84 84 
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union, PRALINE database at www.ipu.org and the Asamblea 
Legislativa website. 
 
 
